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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of inequality in health on economic growth 
in low and middle income countries.∗ The empirical part of the paper uses an 
original cross-national panel data set covering 62 low and middle income 
countries over the period 1985 to 2007. I find a substantial and relatively 
robust negative effect of health inequality on income levels and income growth 
controlling for life expectancy, country and time fixed-effects and a large 
number of other effects that have been shown to matter for growth. The effect 
also holds if health inequality is instrumented to circumvent a potential 
problem of reverse causality. Hence, increasing access to health care for the 
poor can make a substantial contribution to economic growth not only 
through its effect on life expectancy but also through its effect on reduced 
health inequality. 
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1 Introduction
There is an increasing literature studying the effects of health on economic
growth.1 Yet, studying the link between health and income is difficult because
of the problem of measuring health, and the potential endogeneity of health.
This is extensively discussed by Deaton (2006). Empirical evidence suggests
that the relationship is indeed bi-directional, i.e. on the one hand health boosts
growth, for instance by increasing the productivity of workers, by enhancing the
acquisition of cognitive skills and by raising the incentive to accumulate human
and physical capital, and, on the other hand, income fosters health because
richer countries can provide better health technology and supply better and
more health-related public goods and services.2 However, a set of recent papers,
that deal in different, sometimes quite convincing, ways with the problems
mentioned above (Bloom et al., 2004; Weil, 2007; Bloom et al., 2009; Cervelatti
and Sunde, 2009; Lorentzen et al., 2009), have challenged previous findings (e.g.
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007) and show that the effect of health on growth is
important and probably dominates the effect of income on health. The debate
is however not yet settled (see e.g. Deaton, 2006).3
A question that has received less attention in this literature is whether the
extent of inequality in health conditions across socio-economic groups, i.e. the
health gradient, also matters for growth and development.4 If, as microeco-
nomic evidence suggests (see e.g. Thomas and Strauss, 1997), labor produc-
tivity rises with health but at a decreasing rate, a very unequal distribution
of health implies a lower average productivity than a less unequal distribution
of health. Hence, among two countries with a comparable average population
health, the country with larger health inequality will show a lower average
productivity. Moreover, it can be argued that a pronounced health gradient
reinforces the negative effects of low population health mentioned above. By
reducing the capacity of the socio-economically disadvantaged to develop cog-
nitive skills and to acquire and accumulate human and physical capital, health
inequality may make poverty traps more likely. Poor parents with pessimistic
prospects about their children’s health and life expectancy may rather invest in
the number of children than in their quality and thus enhance the vicious cycle
of intergenerationally persistent poverty.
There is ample evidence that health inequalities are generally quite large, in
developed as well as developing countries (see e.g. Van Doorslaer et al., 1997;
1For a comprehensive review of this literature see Jack and Lewis (2009).
2However, health knowledge and technology can easily cross borders, and may explain why
in the last century the world experienced convergence in life expectancy despite the absence
of convergence in income levels (Becker et al., 2005).
3Deaton (2006) argues in particular, that the empirical evidence suggests rather that third
variables drive the correlation between health and income. According to Deaton, the most
obvious candidates are education, in particular female education, and the quality of institu-
tions (including the recognition of population health as a political priority). Female education
because it has been shown to be conductive to better child nutrition, lower child mortality
and lower fertility rates that in turn spur growth. Institutions because they are crucial for a
good quality of health services and health care.
4The reverse effect, from income to health inequality has received more attention, see e.g.
Van Doorslaer et al. (1997) and Van Kippersluis et al. (2009).
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Wagstaff, 2000; Deaton, 2002, 2003; Mackenbach et al., 2003; Cutler et al.,
2008; Grimm et al., 2008, 2009; Van de Poel et al., 2008; Elo, 2009). Cutler
et al. (2008) for instance finds for the US substantial variations in mortality
rates across education, income and ethnic groups. He states that the five-year
mortality rate for the age group 55 to 64 differs by more than 6 percentage points
between the lowest and highest income group. Grimm et al. (2008) estimate
that life expectancy at birth in the poorest and richest income quintile differs
in many low income countries by more than five, sometimes ten, years. Van
de Poel et al. (2008) shows, also for poorer countries, that the prevalence of
stunting and wasting among children in the poorest wealth quintile is often 50
to 100 percent higher than in the richest wealth quintile.
In this paper, I investigate whether inequality in health impedes growth
in low and middle income countries. The empirical part of the paper uses an
original cross-national panel data set covering 62 low and middle income coun-
tries over the period 1985 to 2007. I find a substantial and relatively robust
negative effect of health inequality on income levels and income growth control-
ling for life expectancy, country and time fixed-effects and a large number of
other effects that have to been shown to matter for growth. Countries in which
the poor have a relatively better health status relative to the rich enjoy higher
incomes, and within countries health inequality seems to lower the returns to
average population health.
Overall the findings from this study suggest that in order to reduce health
inequality, policy makers should target their efforts to improving population
health in particular for the poorest population. Well-functioning health-care
facilities are in many parts of the world still very much concentrated in urban
areas and often exclude the rural poor from their services. Formal health in-
surance usually exists only for those employed in the public and private formal
sector, while the majority of the workforce that is employed in the urban infor-
mal and agricultural sector is uninsured. Even HIV/AIDS treatments, which
have expanded tremendously in the past few years in Sub-Saharan Africa, still
bypass many of the poor rural and remote areas. This potential should be used
to boost economic growth. Moreover, such policies should be complemented
by policies that focus on health-related behavior and education. Policies that
target health inequality directly, for example by reducing health care for the
rich, do not seem appropriate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
in more detail the theoretical framework of this paper. Section 3 presents
the data. Section 4 analyzes first the relationship between income and health
inequality levels across and within countries, and, second, estimates a growth
model to investigate the impact of initial health inequality and changes in health
inequality on income growth. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
At the microeconomic level, the debate about the positive effects of health on
skills acquisition, productivity and earnings is less controversial, although the
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involved econometric problems are not less complex (see e.g., Schultz, 2005).
First, the measurement of health at the individual level is not straightforward
and many of the standard household survey tools only provide imperfect health
measures such as self-assessed health or the body mass index. Second, there
is a sizeable problem of omitted variable bias, i.e. unobservable factors, in
particular behavior-related variables that influence both health and earnings.
Third, there is the problem of reverse causality, i.e. higher earnings allow higher
investments in health. All three problems either call for an experimental design
or for some good instrumental variables correlated with health but not directly
related to earnings.
Significant positive effects of health on productivity and earnings have been
found for instance by Strauss (1986), Deolikar (1988), Sahn and Alderman
(1988), Haddad and Bouis (1991), Foster and Rosenzweig (1993), Schultz and
Tansel (1997), Schultz (2003, 2005), Thomas and Strauss (1997), Croppenstedt
and Mueller (2000), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004), Case, Fertig and Paxson
(2005), Alderman et al. (2006) and Maluccio et al. (2009). All these studies
deal in one or another way with the problems mentioned above. I am not aware
of any serious study that has shown a negative effect of health on productivity
and earnings.
However, positive effects at the individual level do not exclude the possibility
of finding insignificant or even negative effects at the macroeconomic level.
First, it could be that healthier workers are only relatively better paid than
unhealthier workers and hence average health could be unrelated to aggregate
income (Jack and Lewis, 2009). Second, the positive effects of better health
at the micro level could be offset through general equilibrium effects. The
standard Solow growth model (closed economy, fixed saving rate, homogeneous
labor) predicts that an increase in population growth, for instance through
better health and longer life expectancy, has in the long-run a negative effect
on income per capita. Historical evidence on the Black Plague and the US 1918
influenza (Brainerd and Siegler, 2003) seem somehow to support this hypothesis.
However, if the Solow model is augmented with human capital (heterogeneous
labor) and assuming that health is an input factor to human capital, one can
get exactly the opposite result. Moreover, in the long run, lower infant and
child mortality may also lead to an over-proportional decline in fertility which
more than offsets the effect of lower mortality on population growth (Bloom
and Canning, 2000; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000).
Leaving these effects aside, there is another interesting aspect associated
with the aggregation from the micro to the macro level of the health effects.
Some of the micro-economic studies mentioned above also analyzed in more
detail the pattern of returns to health. Strauss (1986) for instance found that
calories driven by food prices raised the marginal product of family labor espe-
cially at low calorie levels. Thomas and Strauss (1997) found strong effects of
different nutrition and health variables on earnings and also stated that calories
are subject to diminishing returns. If health is subject to diminishing returns, it
is to be expected that in two countries with the same average health, the coun-
try with the higher inequality in health knows a lower average productivity than
the country with the lower inequality in health. If aggregate labor productivity
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matters for growth — what the macroeconomic growth literature suggests —
then an economy with a less unequal distribution of health should have better
growth prospects than an economy with a more unequal distribution of health.
The following model illustrates this argument. Assume a neoclassical aggre-
gate production function with constant returns to scale of the following form:
Y = AKαH1−α, (1)
where Y is total output, A is total factor productivity and H is total human
capital. Moreover, assume that human capital is determined by the number of
workers L times the average efficiency over all workers, e¯:
H = e¯L, (2)
where e is measured in efficiency units. Assume further that efficiency units
are solely produced with health capital, h (ignoring for the moment the role of
human capital acquired through education). Hence, we have:
e = g(h). (3)
If now it is assumed, in line with the microeconomic evidence discussed above,
that health is subject to positive, but diminishing returns, then
∂e
∂h
> 0 and
∂2e
(∂h)2
< 0. (4)
Assuming a population with heterogeneity in h, average efficiency is given
by:
e¯ =
∫
∞
0
g(h)f(h)dh, (5)
where f(h) is the population distribution of health. Given (4), we see that for
two distributions with equal average health, h¯, the population with the lower
variance in health, σ2h, has the higher average efficiency. Figure 1 illustrates
this point. Distribution a leads to a higher labor efficiency, e¯, than distribution
b.
Figure 1
The average productivity effect
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Besides this productivity effect, there may be (in addition) a number of
indirect channels between health inequality and aggregate income, that mainly
operate over the gradient in health, i.e. are not caused by the variance in health
per se, but depend on the degree to which health varies with socio-economic
status. Given that health is usually bounded at the top of the distribution, a
large health gradient means first of all that the poorer population experiences
unfavorable health conditions.5 This in turn can reinforce existing or even
cause poverty traps. If poor people face adverse health conditions and experi-
ence premature mortality, they are likely, as for instance argued by Lorentzen
et al. (2009), to under-invest in education and physical capital, because the
time horizon over which the reward of such investments could be realized is
relatively short (see also Lleras-Muney and Jayachandran, 2009). Poor parents
with pessimistic prospects about their children’s health and life expectancy may
rather invest in the number of children than in their quality and thus enhance
the vicious cycle of intergenerationally persistent poverty. The adverse effect
on the acquisition on cognitive skills and investment in formal education is re-
inforced if poor health not only lowers the expected returns to education for the
poor, but also makes it more difficult to effectively acquire cognitive skills and
formal education, as some of the studies cited above suggest (Behrman et al.,
2003; Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004; Case, Fertig and Paxson, 2005; Schultz
2005; and Alderman et al., 2006). A straightforward way to integrate the role of
the health gradient in the theoretical model above is to assume that the health
status of an individual i, hi, is a linear function of the maximum population
health, hˆ, the individual’s socioeconomic status, xi and an idiosyncratic shock,
ηi, i.e.:
hi = hˆ+ βxi + ηi, (6)
where β can be interpreted as the health gradient. I assume, in line with
most of the existing empirical evidence, that β > 0, i.e. ∂hi/∂xi > 0, hence
health increases with socio-economic status. Moreover, I assume that socio-
economic status is continuously measured and bounded between −∞ and 0,
i.e. xǫ(−∞, 0). Hence, in a given society, individuals within the highest socio-
economic group (i.e. x = 0) enjoy hˆ corrected by an individual random shock.
The individual random shock ηi is assumed to follow a normal distribution
N(0, σ2η).
Under these assumptions, and assuming that g(h) is a linear function, the
average efficiency in an economy is given by:
e¯ =
∫ 0
−∞
g(h(x; hˆ))m(x)dx, (7)
wherem(x) is the population distribution of socio-economic status x and h(x; hˆ)
is health status conditional on x and the maximum population health, hˆ, i.e.
h(x; hˆ) provides the health pattern implied by Equation (6). g(h(·)) shows
efficiency as a function of health.
5I use the term ‘poor’ here and hereafter as a synonym for an economically disadvantaged
status.
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Under these assumptions and assumption (4) specified above, we obtain:
∂e¯
∂β
|m(x)=const. < 0, (8)
i.e. average labor efficiency declines with the health gradient β holding constant
the distribution of socio-economic status. Note that if I assumed that h is not
a linear but rather a concave function of x, the effect of the health gradient on
e¯ would even be larger. Moreover, the assumptions above imply that average
labor efficiency increases with the density of individuals with a better socio-
economic status. The argument is again illustrated graphically. Figure 2 shows
different health gradients over x. In Situation c, where the gradient is the
largest, the poorest part of the population, in terms of x, has a health capital
that is below the threshold that would have any positive effect on e, translating
the idea of a poverty trap.
Figure 2
The health poverty trap effect
However, with regard to life expectancy, there may also be a positive gen-
eral equilibrium effect associated with higher health inequality. If mortality is
higher among the poor and less healthy, the distribution of health improves
’mechanically’ over time and average health rises.6 Hence, the higher differ-
ential mortality, the lower poverty and the higher aggregate income (Cogneau
and Grimm, 2007). This can be illustrated as follows:
e¯ =
∫ 0
−∞
g(h(x; hˆ))s(x)m(x)dx, (9)
where s(x) is the survival rate of an individual of socio-economic status x. If
the gradient in mortality follows the gradient in health, i.e. s = f(h) and
∂si/∂xi > 0, and if the gradient is large enough, then we may observe:
∂e¯
∂β
|m(x)=const. > 0, (10)
6A symmetrical argument has been made by De la Croix and Doepke (2003) for differential
fertility and the distribution of education.
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i.e. a higher health gradient leads to premature mortality among the less healthy
and less productive, overcompensates the effect in Equation (8) and thus in-
creases aggregate labor efficiency. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3. The
distribution accounting for mortality implies a higher average labor efficiency
than the distribution ignoring it.
Figure 3
The differential mortality effect
In what follows I examine empirically the effect of health inequality on in-
come levels and growth. Obviously, the methodological problems are not less
challenging than those that arise when studying the link between health levels
and income growth. However, some of these problems can be relatively well
dealt with, others must be left for future research. I focus solely on the link
between health inequality and aggregate income and growth of income. It is
also important to note that the emphasis is not on health status among the
poor, although, in practice, reducing health inequality can only imply increas-
ing health status among the poor and certainly not reducing it among the rich.
I do not analyze the determinants of health inequality or the health gradient
itself; this has been done by other authors before (see e.g. Cutler et al., 2008;
Elo, 2009; Van Kippersluis et al., 2009). The essence of these studies is that the
health gradient is determined on the one hand by demand side factors such as
income, housing, nutrition, education, race and ethnicity, absolute and relative
social status, which in turn affect health-related behavior such as investment
in health and health care utilisation, and, on the other hand, by supply side
factors such as the quality and accessibility of the public health system, the
provision of clean water and the inclusion and exclusion in public disease pre-
vention and treatment programs. Given that some of these factors are likely
to be determined by aggregate income, I will have to deal with the potential
endogeneity of health inequality.
3 Data
The main problem in analyzing the causes and consequences of health inequal-
ity is that there is no internationally comparable data available. And even
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within countries, systematic monitoring systems of inequality in health do not
exist; not even mortality rates broken down by socio-economic status. Vital
registration systems, where they are in place, usually do not collect any data
on socio-economic status, such as education, occupation or income. In order
to examine the link between health inequality and income, I use data from the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). DHS were initiated in the 1980s by
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and have collected
information at the household and individual level, in particular on mothers and
children, on fertility, family planning, nutrition, reproductive health and mor-
tality in most of the world’s low and middle income countries since then.7 For
my purpose, the DHS data are well adapted since they allow me to estimate
child mortality rates disaggregated by mothers’ education groups, which I use
to measure socio-economic inequality in health. More precisely, I use the ab-
solute difference in the under-five mortality rates experienced by mothers in
the lowest education group (usually this means in the group of mothers with
no formal education) and mothers with at least secondary education.
This measure is obviously not without shortcomings. First, it is affected
by measurement error due to the wrong dating or sometimes even omission of
past death events. Second, there may also be measurement error in mothers’
education. Third, it is a relatively narrow definition of socio-economic status.
Mothers’ education can of course differ from fathers’ education and the gradient
for income, wealth or social rank will probably differ from that measured for
education. Fourth, child mortality is only a rough measure of health. Many
temporary diseases with lasting effects — for instance on health and cognitive
skills development — and chronic disease do not necessarily end in shorter lives
and are thus not captured by this variable, although they can imply a lower
quality of life, a lower productivity and lower earnings compared to the earnings
of healthier people. Fifth, child mortality is affected by many factors which do
not directly affect adult mortality. Sixth, the ‘absolute difference’ is of course
only an imperfect measure of the gradient, although it is widely used in the
literature. It has to be interpreted as the disparity in health conditions to which
a society is exposed. Thus, it does not take into account the actual shares of
the population that are affected by favorable or unfavorable health conditions,
which would be endogenous in the context of this paper. Despite these caveats, I
think that differences in child mortality across different education groups are an
acceptable indicator of inequality in health in low and middle income countries.
Of course this would not be the case in industrialized countries, where child
mortality today is mainly determined by medical factors and only to a minor
extent by socio-economic factors.8
The DHS also collect anthropometric measurements, allowing for an analy-
sis of nutritional status. Using these data, Van de Poel et al. (2008) computed,
7See http://www.measuredhs.com.
8Another popular measure of health inequality is the (adjusted) concentration index (see
e.g. Wagstaff et al., 1991; Erreygers, 2009). This measure would be applicable here, if for
all DHS used, we had a continuous measure of social status such as income or wealth and if
the health outcome could be measured at the individual level, which is not the case for the
mortality probability.
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for a subset of the countries and periods used here, inequality in ‘wasting’
(weight for height), which is a measure of the deficit in tissue and fat mass and
is sensitive to temporary food shortages and episodes of illness (World Health
Organization, 1995). Instead of mothers’ education, Van de Poel et al. (2008)
defined the gradient over wealth quintiles, i.e. the difference in wasting between
the poorest and richest wealth quintile. Wealth itself is measured using a wealth
index over various household assets. For the subset of 46 countries, for which
Van de Poel et al.’s measure is available, the correlation coefficient between
this health inequality measure and my measure based on child mortality by ed-
ucation groups is 0.4. This is quite substantial and suggests that the education
gradient in under-five mortality is a good and broad-based measure of health
inequality.
In total I use DHS data for 62 countries. A few observations had to be
discarded because of incomplete information on child mortality. For 47 countries
at least 2 DHS are available, for 31 countries at least 3 and for 14 countries
4 or more. In total this yields 158 country-period observations spread over
the period 1985 to 2007, i.e. 23 years. The list of included countries and the
corresponding survey years are listed in Table A1 (Appendix). I merged this
data set with data on income, life expectancy and a large number of potentially
relevant control variables.
As a measure of income, I use GDP per capita in constant 2005 international
$PPP taken from the World Development Indicator Database (World Bank,
2009). From the same data set, I draw life expectancy at birth, investment as
a share of GDP, financial depth (money and quasi money as a share of GDP),
trade openness (exports and imports as a share of GDP) and net secondary
school enrolment. In addition, I use total fertility rates from the DHS. From
the Gallup et al. (1999) database, I extract ‘a country’s share of land within
100km of the coastline’ and ‘a country’s share of land in tropical areas’. Finally,
I use Gini coefficients of income inequality from the WIDER inequality data
base (WIDER, 2008).
I divide the total observation period from 1985 to 2007 into four five-year
spells and one three-year spell. All variables that vary over time are, if available
on an annual basis such as GDP, expressed as five-year averages. The data from
the DHS comes from specific years and is allocated to the corresponding spell.
Given that I rely on DHS data, the empirical analysis is limited to low
and middle income countries. On the one hand this is obviously a rather nar-
row focus compared to most other studies in the growth literature (although
these often focus only on high and middle income countries, leaving out poor
countries), but on the other hand, this focus may remove an important part
of the unobserved heterogeneity across countries. The demographic literature
clearly shows that the demographic transition in Western Europe and its off-
shoots was very different in terms of timing and speed from the demographic
transition currently undergone by most of the low and middle income countries
(see e.g. Watkins, 1987). This is a potential source of bias in studies mixing
data from rich OCED countries and low income countries. Finally, inequality
in health is less pronounced in high income countries (see e.g. Grimm et al.,
2008) and, potentially less relevant for growth than in low and middle income
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countries. In particular, the above-mentioned productivity effect is unlikely to
be substantial given that most industrialized countries are probably already
situated on the flat part of the health-productivity curve.
Table 1
Description of sample
1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07
GDP per capita 2809.7 2059.9 2194.4 2546.2 2185.3
StdDev 2064.3 1403.0 1923.7 2631.0 1787.7
Life Expect. 59.2 56.9 58.5 57.3 59.0
StdDev 7.3 8.8 8.1 9.9 9.0
Health Inequal. 86.4 83.6 75.3 67.9 66.3
StdDev 47.2 36.7 34.7 35.5 37.6
Total Fert. Rate. 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.5
StdDev 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6
Pop share 0-14 0.421 0.428 0.417 0.400 0.400
StdDev 0.052 0.046 0.050 0.061 0.069
Pop share 15-64 0.543 0.538 0.547 0.562 0.561
StdDev 0.046 0.041 0.044 0.050 0.053
Perc. secondary enrollment 0.276 0.287 0.385 0.385
StdDev 0.151 0.222 0.232 0.255
Trade Openness 0.536 0.537 0.581 0.703 0.720
StdDev 0.252 0.254 0.226 0.296 0.346
Governm. Consump. 0.134 0.134 0.128 0.143 0.119
StdDev 0.046 0.059 0.072 0.083 0.048
Share Coastal Land 0.266 0.286 0.259 0.244 0.239
StdDev 0.270 0.320 0.266 0.297 0.323
Share Land in Tropics 0.880 0.813 0.792 0.791 0.778
StdDev 0.308 0.350 0.375 0.383 0.395
Latin America and Carib. 0.300 0.188 0.182 0.175 0.182
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.550 0.500
Middle East and North-Africa 0.100 0.094 0.068 0.050 0.045
East. Europe and Central Asia 0 0.031 0.068 0.050 0.045
South Asia 0.050 0.094 0.091 0.050 0.136
East-Asia and Pacific 0.100 0.094 0.068 0.100 0.045
Number of observations 20 32 44 40 12
Table 1 describes the sample used. The statistics are presented separately
for each spell, and thus provide some insights into the demographic and eco-
nomic change experienced by the countries under study. However, changes over
time, but in particular between the first and second period, have to be inter-
preted with caution, since many countries join the data set only in the second
spell. This can also explain the variation in the average GDP per capita over
time. Life expectancy is relatively stable over time. Health inequality declines
from 86 to 66, i.e. the difference in the number of children that die before
the age of five to mothers with low education and mothers with high educa-
tion declines by 20 children per 1,000 or 23 percent. Fertility declines over
time showing that almost all countries have now entered the second phase of
their demographic transition. Secondary school enrollment increases from 28
percent to 39 percent. Regarding the composition of the sample, we see that
from 1990 onwards about 50 percent of all observations belong to Sub-Saharan
African countries. About 18 percent belong to Latin American and Caribbean
11
countries. The shares of the remaining regions vary between 5 percent and 10
percent.
4 Findings - Health Inequality and Development
In a first step I analyze the partial correlation between health inequality and
income using the full set of 158 country-period observations. I also analyze
the within-country variance by introducing country fixed-effects into the model,
however, given that some countries enter the data set with only few observations
and given that demographic change is rather slow, the analysis of between-
country variance is preferred. Then, in a second step, I analyze the effect of
initial health inequality and changes in health inequality on long term growth.
To do so, I define for each country, conditional on the data availability, spells of
maximal length and compute the average annual growth rate over these spells.
4.1 Level regressions
Before running any regressions, it is useful to examine graphically the corre-
lations between the main variables of interest. Figures 4a-c show the pairwise
scatter plots between log GDP per capita, log life expectancy at birth and log
health inequality. Figure 4a shows what is well-known: a clear positive corre-
lation between live expectancy and GDP. This is the inverse and logarithmic
version of the famous Preston curve (Preston, 1975). However, the correlation is
far from perfect. In the early nineties, for instance, Bolivia and Bangladesh had
a similar level of life expectancy of about 56 years, but Bolivia was four times
richer at that time than Bangladesh. Other countries, such as South-Africa
and Botswana, have relatively high levels of income but, due to the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, low levels of life expectancy.
Figure 4b shows a negative but relatively weak correlation between log life
expectancy and log health inequality. The relationship seems to be non-linear
with particular low levels of health inequality in high life-expectancy countries.
However, the variance in that part of the distribution is large. Many of the
countries with high life expectancy experience a high health inequality, higher
than many of the low life expectancy countries. In the mid-eighties for instance,
Brazil and Tunisia had about the same life expectancy of 65 years but health
inequality was 30 percent larger in Brazil compared to Tunisia.
Finally, Figure 4c shows a clear negative correlation between health inequal-
ity and GDP per capita. The slope of the linear regression line is –0.53 and is
highly significant, suggesting that on average a one percent decline in the dif-
ference between the number of children per 1,000 children who died before the
age of five in the low and high education group lowers income per capita by 0.5
percent. It is again interesting to see that countries with relatively high income
levels do not necessarily have lower health inequality. They can be found over
the total range of the health inequality distribution.
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Figure 4
Cross-country scatter plots of GDP per capita, life expectancy and health inequality
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I now turn to multivariate regression analysis using the following specifica-
tion:
lnGDPit = β0+β1 lnLEXPit+β2 lnHIit+X
′
itβ3+Z
′
iβ4+λi+T
′
tτ +εit, (11)
where lnGDPit stands for the log real GDP per capita in international $PPP of
country i in period t, lnLEXPit for the log life expectancy at birth, lnHIit for
log health inequality measured as described above, the vector Xit for other time-
varying control variables such as trade openness and government consumption
over GDP, the vector Zi for time-constant controls such as geography, the vector
Tt for period-specific fixed-effects and εit for country and time-specific random
shocks. The parameter λi stands alternatively for country random or country
fixed-effects. If the latter is used, the vector Zi has of course to be dropped from
the equation. As mentioned above, given that demographic change is rather
slow and given that I deal with a rather short (and unbalanced) panel, random
effects are preferred to fixed-effects, however I will present the results for both.
The control for country random or alternatively country fixed-effects as well
as time-shocks and many other variables that might be correlated with both
health inequality and income, should reduce the problem of omitted variable
bias, but of course it always remains a concern in cross-country regressions of
this type. However, a more worrying problem is reverse causality, in particular
in a regression in levels. Richer countries probably provide more health services
and health-related public goods to the poor population and therefore health
inequality may be smaller in richer countries. However, an argument could also
be made that in richer countries, more health technology and services are offered
by the private sector, and hence, in these countries richer people have more
possibilities to invest individually in their health, which may increase health
inequality. Within countries, economic downturns, whether caused by economic
factors or climatic fluctuations, may first of all hurt the poor and therefore also
increase health inequality. In the absence of any convincing instrument for
health inequality (and life expectancy), the only remedy I apply here is to also
estimate Equation (11) with GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) in the hope that
this fixes the problem and yields coherent results with the standard random
and fixed-effects estimates.
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the results of a regression of GDP per capita
on life expectancy with random effects and a reduced set of controls. The effect
of life expectancy is highly significant. The estimated elasticity is 0.74, i.e. on
average, across countries an increase in life expectancy by one percent leads to
an increase in income by 0.74 percent. The sample mean of life expectancy is
about 58 years, one percent of that is seven months. That would mean if Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, had the life expectancy of Latin America and the
Caribbean, the income gap between both would narrow by about 10%. In other
words a one-year improvement in a population’s life expectancy contributes to
an increase of 1.25 percent in output. The total fertility rate and trade openness
have the expected signs. The positive sign of government consumption over
GDP may surprise, but is in a sample of low and middle income countries not
unusual. The regression in Column (1) explains 44 percent of the total variance
between countries and almost 20 percent of the within-country variance.
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Table 2
GDP per capita, five-year spells, 1985-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(GLS) (GLS) (FE (within)) (GLS)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Log Life Expect. 0.729 *** 0.26 0.652 ** 0.26 -0.042 0.28 0.581 ** 0.27
Log Health Inequal. -0.093 * 0.05 -0.108 ** 0.05 -0.093 * 0.05
Log Total Fert. Rate. -0.602 *** 0.15 -0.502 *** 0.15 -0.073 0.18 -0.443 *** 0.16
Trade Openness 0.328 ** 0.15 0.284 * 0.15 0.325 * 0.17 0.271 * 0.15
Governm. Consump. 1.244 ** 0.56 1.088 * 0.56 1.529 ** 0.59 1.116 ** 0.56
Share Coastal Land 0.306 0.32
Share Land in Tropics -0.195 0.24
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects RE RE FE RE
No. of Spells 158 158 158 158
No. of Countries 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.494 0.483 0.306 (within) 0.428
(5) (6) (7)
(GLS) (GMM) (OLS)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Log Life Expect. 0.684 ** 0.38 1.163 *** 0.44 1.725 ** 0.77
Log Health Inequal. -0.084 ** 0.04 -0.091 ** 0.04
Log Inequality Wasting -0.176 ** 0.07
Log Total Fert. Rate. -0.290 0.18 0.259 0.19 -0.910 ** 0.39
Secondary Enroll. 1.328 *** 0.36
Trade Openness 0.197 0.14 -0.043 0.12 0.324 0.51
Governm. Consump. -0.459 0.67 0.125 0.42 2.438 1.94
Share Coastal Land 0.068 0.34 0.161 0.34
Share Land in Tropics -0.217 0.25 0.495 0.35
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects RE FE No
No. of Spells 79 60 41
No. of Countries 43 30 41
R-squared 0.619 0.628
Notes: Intercept omitted from Table. ∗ significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ significant at the 5%
level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
If health inequality is added to the list of regressors (column (2)), I find a
significant and negative coefficient. The size of the coefficient suggests that a
one percent increase in health inequality reduces income per capita by about 0.1
percent. The sample mean of the under-five mortality gradient is 72.7. Thus,
a reduction of 10 percent implies that the number of children who die before
the age of five born to mothers with a low education level decreases by about
seven children per 1,000 children and this leads to an increase in income by
about one percent. It is important to emphasize again that the gradient in
child mortality is used as a proxy for the gradient in health. If the focus was
on the direct effects of child mortality, we would have to use lagged values, to
relate the productive years of these children to income.
If I use the log of under-five mortality instead of the health inequality mea-
sure as a regressor, I find an insignificant effect and the coefficient of life ex-
pectancy is reduced and loses significance. This shows that the chosen measure
of health inequality does not simply pick up the effect of child mortality on
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life-expectancy. If Equation (11) is estimated with fixed-effects (column (3))
instead of random-effects, the effect of health inequality is more or less un-
changed, suggesting that omitted variable bias is probably not a substantial
problem. However, life expectancy and fertility become insignificant, which is
not surprising given that both variables move only slowly and thus do not ex-
hibit enough within-country variation over such a short period of time in order
to identify their effects on income. In column (4), I add further geographic
variables to the list of controls but those are not significant and change only
slightly the coefficients of life expectancy and fertility. The coefficient of health
inequality is unchanged.
The lack of data on secondary school enrolment only allows me to introduce
this variable in a sub-sample comprising 78 out of the 158 country-year obser-
vations (column (5)). Secondary school enrolment has a positive and highly
significant impact. The effect of fertility becomes insignificant, but the effects
of life expectancy and health inequality are again more or less unchanged. I also
tested whether investment over GDP has any impact on GDP per capita and
whether its introduction changes the effects of the other included variables, but
this was not the case. Finally, one may wonder whether health inequality is just
a proxy for income inequality. I tested this possibility by using Gini coefficients
from the WIDER data base. As for school enrollment, not all country-year
observations are covered, but when introduced in a regression without health
inequality as an additional regressor, income inequality enters with a positive
sign and is insignificant (p = 0.56). Hence, I can exclude the possibility that
health inequality is just a proxy of income inequality.
In column (6) I use GMM for estimation to account for the possible endo-
geneity of health inequality, life expectancy and fertility with respect to income.
Given that GMM implies to instrument first differences of the endogenous vari-
ables by their lagged values, I can only use those countries that enter the data
set at least with three observations. The coefficient of life expectancy is sig-
nificant and larger than in the random effects estimations above. The point
estimate implies that an increase in life expectancy by one year, increases GDP
per capita by about 2 percent. This is half the size estimated by Bloom et al.
(2004). The effect of health inequality is also significant and with respect to
its size almost unchanged in comparison to the RE and FE estimates reported
above. Thus, independent of the estimation method, I find a fairly robust
negative effect of health inequality on income.
Before estimating the model in growth rates, I do another robustness check.
Instead of measuring health inequality by the gradient in under-five mortality,
I use the gradient in wasting (weight for height), which is, as explained above, a
measure of the deficit of tissue and fat mass and is sensitive to temporary food
shortages and episodes of illness. This is thus a completely different measure of
health. In addition, the gradient will be defined not over low and high education
groups but over the poorest and richest wealth quintiles. This measure is taken
from Van de Poel et al. (2008) and only available for the most recent DHS and
hence I use a simple OLS estimator. Column (7) shows the results. I find again
a significant negative coefficient, suggesting that health inequality is associated
with lower income.
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4.2 Growth regressions
Whereas the analysis above focused on short term effects of health inequality on
income across and within countries, I now focus on the longer term relationship.
I regress growth rates in income, not income levels, as in the previous section, on
changes in life expectancy and changes in health inequality, controlling for initial
life expectancy, initial health inequality and initial income.9 The advantage of
analyzing growth rates and controlling for initial conditions is that the problem
of reverse causality is mitigated, but it may of course not eliminate it altogether.
Countries that experience low growth over a longer period may not have the
capacity to invest the necessary resources in health infrastructure to cope with
diseases.
However, controlling for initial conditions in health and health inequality
is important for another reason. Bloom et al. (2009) argue and empirically
show that countries with good initial health are the countries that benefited
least from subsequent global health technology improvements. At the same
time these were the countries whose economies have grown fastest in the post
World War II period. Therefore, ignoring the initial health means to ignore the
pronounced convergence in health and this can introduce a negative bias in the
effect of health on income, since the fast growing economies with better initial
health conditions experienced the lowest health gains. A similar argument may
apply to health inequality, i.e. countries with higher initial health inequality
may have experienced larger reductions in health inequality.
Hence, I specify the growth model between two periods, 0 and 1, as:
∆ lnGDPi = β0 + β1∆ lnLEXPi + β2∆ lnHIi +∆X
′
iβ3+
β4 lnLEXPi0 + β5 lnHIi0 + β6 lnGDPi0 + Z
′
iβ7 + β8Si + νi, (12)
where the variables have the same meaning as in Equation (11). As usual the
Greek letter ∆ refers to the difference. The growth rate in GDP is defined as
follows: for each country with at least two observations in the data set, I retain
the period of maximum length covered by the data and compute the average
annual growth rate, i.e. for a country with DHS data in the periods 1985/90,
1995/2000 and 2000/2005, I retain the period 1985/90 to 2000/05 and define
the growth rate as the difference between the log average income in the final
period and the log average income in the initial period. Then, I divide this
growth rate by the number of years covered by that period. To avoid any bias
due to the different length of these spells across countries, I control in addition
for the country-specific spell length Si. The average spell length is 12 years.
9Note that improvements in health inequality that increase aggregate efficiency would raise
the growth rate of an economy during the transition to the new steady-state, but it may not
necessarily raise the long run steady-state growth rate. However, the results below suggest
that most of the countries in the sample have not (yet) attained their steady-state.
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Figure 5
Cross-country scatter plots of changes in GDP per capita, life expectancy and health inequality
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(c) Health inequality and Income growth
Again, I start with some scatter plots. There are 46 countries included
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in this sample. Figure 5a shows that in this data set there is virtually no
(unconditional) relationship between changes in life expectancy and changes
in income. There is also no relationship between changes in life expectancy
and changes in health inequality (Figure 5b). However, there is a relatively
clear negative relationship between changes in health inequality and changes in
income (Figure 5c).
Table 3
Growth of GDP per capita, 1985-2007
(1) (2) (3)
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
∆ Log Life Expect. 0.420 0.29 0.345 0.28 0.638 * 0.28
∆ Log Health Inequal. -0.149 * 0.07 -0.174 *** 0.06
∆ Log Total Fert. Rate. 0.094 0.31 0.112 0.23 0.232 0.19
Initial Log Life Expect. 0.071 ** 0.03 0.061 ** 0.03 0.072 *** 0.02
Initial Log Health Inequal. -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.01
Initial Log GDP per capita -0.006 0.01 -0.009 * 0.001 -0.007 * 0.004
∆ Trade Openness 0.520 *** 0.18
∆ Governm. Consump. -0.861 * 0.36
Share Coastal Land -0.037 ** 0.01
Share Land in Tropics -0.006 0.01
Spell length -0.002 0.001 -0.002 ** 0.00 -0.002 ** 0.001
No. of Countries 46 46 46
R-squared 0.270 0.349 0.589
(4) (5)
(2SLS) (2SLS)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
∆ Log Life Expect. 0.289 0.32 0.316 0.25
∆ Log Health Inequal. -0.314 *** 0.07 -0.240 * 0.14
Initial Log Life Expect. 0.046 * 0.03 0.033 ** 0.02
Initial Log Health Inequal. -0.004 0.01 -0.011 *** 0.002
Initial Log GDP per capita -0.014 *** 0.005 -0.013 *** 0.003
Spell length -0.002 *** 0.001 -0.001 *** 0.008
No. of Countries 44 44
R-squared 0.436 0.506
IVs used Climate zone Malaria index 1966
variables Vaccinations
Test statistics
First stage F -Statistic 11.8 3.6
Hansen J-statistic 3.239 1.187
p-value 0.862 0.552
Notes: Intercept omitted from Table. ∗ significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ significant at the 5%
level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
Table 3 shows the regression results. In column (1) health inequality is
excluded. Initial life expectancy has a significant positive impact on subsequent
growth, i.e. countries that started with a higher life expectancy experienced
higher economic growth. The point estimate is 0.071. This implies that an
increase in life expectancy of five years at the sample mean (here 56 years) is
associated with a growth effect of 0.6. This estimate is fully in line with other
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estimates in the literature (see Bloom et al., 2004.) Changes in life expectancy
are also positively associated with growth, but the coefficient is in this regression
only significant at 15 percent. Initial income has the expected negative sign,
but is insignificant. Changes in the total fertility rate are also insignificant.
Column (2) shows the regression results when I add initial health inequality
and changes in health inequality. Initial health inequality is not significant
but changes in health inequality enter with a significant negative sign. The
estimated coefficient implies that a country that reduces health inequality by 1
percent per year, increases its annual rate of economic growth by 0.15 percent.
The sample mean of the under-five mortality gradient is 85.2. Thus, a reduction
of 5 percent per year would mean that the number of children who die before
the age of five of mothers with a low education level decreases by about 4.25
children per 1,000 children per year. Over a period of ten years this would
imply a GDP per capita that is higher by almost 8 percent compared to a
situation without such an improvement in health inequality. Note that if the
relevant channel between health inequality and economic growth is via the
average productivity effect discussed in Section 2, continuous improvements
in health inequality are needed to get a growth effect in the long-run steady-
state. This may be possible over a certain period, but will probably no longer
be possible if the total population of a country has adequate access to health
services. Probably, none of the countries in the sample has achieved that state
yet. Anyway, the significant coefficient of initial income per capita suggests
that the countries in the sample are rather in the process of transition than
close to their steady-state.
Finally in Column (3), I add the change of government consumption, the
change of trade openness and two additional geographical control variables —
the share of the land within 100km of the coastline and the share of land in
tropical areas — to the list of regressors. Trade openness has the expected
positive effect and government consumption now a negative effect. The share
of land within 100km of the coast enters negatively, which is not as expected.
The ‘tropics’ variable is insignificant. But more importantly, the effect of ini-
tial life expectancy and of changes in life expectancy are now significant. The
effect of changes in health inequality is also highly significant (p < 0.01 and
is slightly higher than in Column (2). This means that improvements in life
expectancy that are accompanied by reductions in health inequality imply a
double dividend for growth. Initial income is now also significant, but its effect
is very small. This is however no surprise, given that I also control for initial
life expectancy. I also tested whether income inequality as measured by the
Gini coefficient plays any role or even annuls the effect associated with health
inequality. However, the obtained coefficient for income inequality was insignifi-
cant (results not shown). All other effects were robust to the inclusion of income
inequality, even though due to the reduced sample size – the Gini coefficient
is not available for all countries in my sample – changes in life-expectancy and
some of the other controls were no longer significant.
To address the potential problem of reverse causality, I now re-estimate
Equation (12) by instrumenting the change in differential mortality observed
in each country (∆ lnHIi) with two sets of instruments. First, I use the ‘Fal-
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ciparam Malaria Index’ for 1966 taken from the Gallup et al. (1999) data
base. Malaria incidence should be relevant because countries strongly affected
by malaria have higher mortality levels and a larger differential mortality and
hence there is also more scope for reductions in differential mortality. Using the
index for 1966 should ensure that the variable is largely exogenous to growth
rates in the 1980s and later. Second, I use the current share of children vacci-
nated against Measles and DPT (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus). Both mea-
sures are taken from the World Bank Development Indicator Data Base (World
Bank, 2009). The assumption is that vaccination campaigns in low income
countries are often financed by foreign aid and thus are exogenous to economic
growth. The variables should be relevant because the higher the proportion of
benefitting children, the faster health inequality can be reduced. Third, I use
nine variables measuring the shares of a country’s land located in nine differ-
ent climate zones (polar non-desert, boreal regions, temperate desert, tropical
and subtropical desert, dry temperate, wet temperate, subtropics, tropics and
water). These variables are also taken from the Gallup et al. (1999) data base.
Climate should have an influence on the prevalence of certain diseases, given
that many diseases require specific ranges of temperature, humidity and water
to survive and spread. The disease environment in turn should have an effect
on the extent of health inequality and the potential to reduce the same. For all
three sets of variables I then assume that they mainly affect economic growth
through their effect on health and health inequality but do not affect growth
directly. Note that I do not address here the potential endogeneity of changes
in life expectancy. I just focus on the role of health inequality.
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 4 show the results. In column (4) I use
the climate zone variables. The first-stage F -statistic is 11.8 and thus slightly
above the required critical level of about 10, suggesting that the instrument
is indeed relevant. The effect of changes in health inequality on growth is
still negative and significant and even higher than in Columns (2) and (3). If
reverse causality was a problem, one would expect that the coefficient of health
inequality would be reduced in its absolute size when instrumented. So either
reverse causality is not a problem, but measurement error is, which would be
consistent with a downward bias, or the instrument is not powerful enough.
Again, the latter seems rather unlikely, since the F−statistic is satisfying, the
standard error is fairly low and the coefficient significant at the 1 percent level.
The overidentification test is also passed, suggesting that the instrument can
be considered as exogenous. Moreover, if economic growth is regressed on the
nine climate zone variables directly, the joint F -Test yields a p-value of only
27 percent, what also suggests that the impact is mainly via health inequality
and not directly on growth. Alternatively, if I use the vaccination variables and
malaria prevalence in 1966 as instruments, I also find a relatively high effect of
health inequality, but the standard error is relatively large and the F -statistic
is, with a value of 3.6, very low. Thus this result should be interpreted with
the necessary caution.
Figure 6 presents the partial scatter plots associated with the estimated
coefficients in Column (3). Figure 6a shows the partial correlation between
changes in life expectancy and economic growth once the effect of all other
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variables is netted out.10 The relationship is now clearly positive, in contrast to
what the unconditional relationship in Figure 5a suggested. Figure 6b shows the
partial relationship between changes in health inequality and economic growth.
Again, the slope is clearly negative.
Figure 6
Partial relationship between changes in GDP per capita, life expectancy and health inequality
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5 Conclusion
This paper presents a first attempt in analyzing the effects of inequality in
health on economic growth. Health inequality is measured by the gradient in
child mortality over mothers’ education groups and is used as a proxy for the
10These growth rates are computed by estimating the growth equation in Table 3, Column
(3), without the changes in life expectancy variable. The estimates are then used to predict
economic growth. The predicted values are then subtracted from the observed growth rates
which provides growth rates where the effect of all other variables is netted out.
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disparity in health conditions to which different socio-economic groups in a so-
ciety are exposed. Despite the obvious limits of such a narrow definition and
the practical problems in measuring life expectancy and child mortality in low
and middle income countries, I find a relatively robust negative effect of health
inequality on economic growth. This result holds whether I estimate an income
regression in levels or growth rates, whether I use repeated short spells and
control alternatively for fixed or random-effects or whether I analyze a single
long spell per country. It is also robust when health inequality is instrumented
either using GMM or simply using classical instrumental variables. A conserv-
ative estimate is that a reduction in the number of children who die before the
age of five by about 4.25 per 1,000 children per year (i.e. by five percent) born
to mothers with a low education level leads to an almost eight percent increase
in GDP per capita after a period of 10 years. I also find a positive effect of life
expectancy on economic growth that is – in terms of its magnitude – in line
with other estimates in the literature.
The channels by which health inequality affects growth need further analy-
sis. The theoretical discussion that motivated the empirical analysis in this
paper suggests that lower inequality in health and a lower gradient in health
may increase aggregate labor productivity and may make it less likely that
households are locked in health-related poverty traps. These effects seem not
to be offset by the direct effect of differential mortality on the composition
of the labor force. Disaggregated data is needed to investigate these channels
further.
The results of this paper raise another important issue regarding the link
between health and economic growth. Some of the studies analyzing this link
take estimates of the effect of health from microeconomic studies and use these
to calibrate the size of the effects at the aggregate level (see e.g. Shastry
and Weil, 2003; Weil, 2007). If inequality in health indeed lowers the growth
effects of average health, this approach may overestimate the benefits of health
improvements.
What are the policy implications of this study? Given that health always has
an upper boundary regardless of how it is measured, reducing health inequality
means in particular improving health conditions for the poor. Hence, increasing
access to health care for the poor and increasing health care utilization through
affordable health insurance are policy options that can be considered in this
context. Such policies can be complemented by policies that improve education
and raise income among the poor. Education raises the awareness of health
benefits and the capability to deal with health problems. Income is important
because it usually improves nutrition and housing that are both important
factors in adult and child excess mortality among the poor. Attacking the
gradient directly by preventing the rich from care they need and can afford is
certainly not an appropriate policy.11
11See on this issue the discussion in Deaton (2002).
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Appendix
List of used DHS (years in parentheses)
Armenia (2000, 2005), Bangladesh (1993, 1996, 1999, 2004), Benin (1996,
2001, 2006), Bolivia (1989, 1994, 1998, 2003), Botswana (1988), Brazil (1986,
1996), Burkina Faso (1992, 1998, 2003), Burundi (1987), Cambodia (2000,
2005), Cameroon (1991, 1998, 2004), Chad (1996, 2004), Colombia (1986,
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005), Congo Democratic Republic (2007), Congo/Brazaville
(2005), Cote d’Ivore (1994, 1998), Dominican Republic (1991, 2002, 2007),
Ecuador (1987), Eritrea (1995, 2002), Ethiopia (2000, 2005), Gabon (2000),
Ghana (1988, 1993, 1998, 2003), Guatemala (1987, 1995, 1998), Guinea (1992,
1999, 2005), Haiti (1994, 2000, 2005), Honduras (2005), India (1992, 1998,
2005), Indonesia (1987, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2002), Jordan (1990, 1997, 2004,
2007), Kenya (1989, 1993, 1998, 2003), Kyrgyz Republic (1997), Lesotho (2004),
Liberia (1986, 2007), Madagascar (1992, 1997, 2003), Malawi (1992, 2000,
2004), Mali (1987, 1995, 2001, 2006), Mauritania (1999, 2003), Morocco (1987,
1992, 1995 2003), Mozambique (1997, 2003), Nambia (1992, 2000, 2006), Nepal
(1996, 2001, 2006), Nicaragua (1997, 2001), Niger (1992, 1998, 2006), Nigeria
(1990, 1999, 2003), Pakistan (1990, 2006), Paraguay (1990), Peru (1986, 1991,
1996, 2000, 2004), Philippines (1993, 1998, 2003), Rwanda (1992, 2000, 2005),
Senegal (1986, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2005), South-Africa (1998, 2003), Sri Lanka
(1987), Sudan (1990), Tanzania (1992, 1996, 1999, 2004), Thailand (1987), Togo
(1988, 1998), Tunisia (1988), Turkey (1993, 1998, 2003), Uganda (1988, 1995,
2000, 2006), Uzbekistan (1996), Vietnam (1997, 2002), Yemen (1991, 1997),
Zambia (1992, 1996, 2001).
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